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Abstract
Previous researches show that buy (growth) companies conduct income increasing earnings management in order to meet
forecasts and generate positive forecast Errors (FEs). This behavior however, is not inherent in sell (non-growth) companies.
Using the aforementioned background, this research hypothesizes that since sell companies are pressured to avoid income
increasing earnings management, they are capable, and in fact more inclined, to pursue income decreasing Forecast
Management (FM) with the purpose of generating positive FEs. Using a sample of 6553 firm-years of companies that are
listed in the NYSE between the years 2005–2010, the study determines that sell companies conduct income decreasing FM
to generate positive FEs. However, the frequency of positive FEs of sell companies does not exceed that of buy companies.
Using the efficiency perspective, the study suggests that even though buy and sell companies have immense motivation in
avoiding negative FEs, they exploit different but efficient strategies, respectively, in order to meet forecasts. Furthermore,
the findings illuminated the complexities behind informative and opportunistic forecasts that falls under the efficiency
versus opportunistic theories in literature.
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Introduction
Dutta and Gigler [2] suggest that companies have strong
incentives to avoid negative Forecast Errors (FEs) or/and generate
positive FEs. They propose a contractual model where the
management utility is mainly based on whether the reported
earnings meet or miss the forecasts. Their theoretical model
assumes that both earnings forecasts and earnings management
generate positive FEs. It explains and integrates both pessimistic
(opportunistic) and optimistic (efficiency) forecasts behavior of
companies by illuminating the effect of earnings forecasts on the
earnings management.
Abarbanell and Leahvy [1] indicated that the companies’ ability
to manipulate earning influences the extent of earnings manage-
ment. They argue that the companies with higher growth rates are
more capable in manipulating profits. Abarbanell and Leahvy [1]
assume that the companies that are recommended by analysts to
be bought (hereafter buy companies) are classified as growth type
companies that will enjoy high profitability. They show that these
companies conduct income increasing earnings management in
order to meet forecasts and generate positive FEs.
However Abarbanell and Leahvy [1] discovered that the
companies recommended by analysts to be sold (hereafter sell
companies) are unable to conduct earnings management. Among
the reasons for this are that firstly, the sell companies’ stock prices
are less susceptible to earnings news, which may render their
earnings management ineffective with regards to influencing
investors’ decisions. In other words, sell companies cannot
effectively manipulate and increase their low profit to boost their
stock prices. Secondly, sell companies possess insufficient sums of
available accounting reserves and pre-managed earnings for them
to achieve any relevant earning target.
According to Dutta and Gigler [2], sell companies might also
suffer from communication restrictions. This seems most logical, as
the lack of resources will render sell companies unable to
communicate the full scope of their rich information set to
investors via the manipulation of reported earnings. Therefore,
communication restrictions are binding upon sell companies.
It seems that since sell companies eschew income increasing
earnings management, they are both capable and more inclined to
pursue income decreasing Forecast Management (FM) to generate
positive forecasts errors. Thus, the aim of this research is to
examine the effects of the analysts’ recommendations representing
the buy and sell companies on the managers’ decisions towards
FM.
This research enriches the literature by examining whether sell
(non-growth) companies engage in negative FM to realize positive
FEs. The importance of the research is that it shows whether
analysts’ recommendations in terms of buying or selling of the
stocks have informational value that can be used by individual
investors to assess the optimism or pessimism of management
forecasts. Additionally, the findings obtained here would be useful
for future theoretical developments.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature and highlights the problem. Section 3 develops the
hypothesis, while the research methodology is explained in section
4. Section 5 describes the findings, and section 6 presents the
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discussion and links the findings to the literature. Finally, section 7
concludes the article with a few issues on the implications of policy.
Literature Review
According to Hirst et al. [3], optimism and pessimism of the
forecasts are characteristics over which managers are most in
control. However, they appear to be the least well-understood
components of earnings forecasts, both in terms of theory and
empirical research. There are different point of views in the
literature on optimism and pessimism of the forecasts. The two
dominant views on optimism and pessimism of the forecasts are
explained in the following paragraphs.
The first view fits the Watts and Zimmerman [4] opportunistic
perspective, and is consistent with criticisms on aligning the
management’s interest with an increase in stock prices, which is
advocated by Jensen and Meckling [5]. The theories of FM
associated with this view have primarily modeled the forecasts as
an opportunity that the management will use to pre-empt litigation
concerns, influence their reputation, and produce positive FEs
while simultaneously influencing stock prices.
Das et al. [6] stated that since stock prices is susceptible to
management’s forecasts, the management tend to report a higher
forecast. On the other hand, stock prices are highly susceptible to
the management’s FE [7,8]. Thus, the more negative the FE is, the
more it is perceived as a sign of bad news, and such bad news will
most definitely lead to a dramatic fall of stock prices [9,10]. In
order to prevent such incidents, the management is inclined to
engage in practices called income decreasing FM (or reporting
pessimistic forecast) in order to beat forecasts and create positive
earnings surprises [11–13].
The second view corresponds to the efficiency perspective.
Deegan and Unerman [14] stated that a great deal of positive
accounting researches adopted the efficiency perspective. This
perspective proposes that managers will choose to use a particular
accounting method, as it will most efficiently provide a record of
how the organization actually performs. The management will
also use forecasts to pass insider information to outsiders. In fact,
by forecasting earnings, information asymmetry is reduced,
leading to a reduction in the firm’s cost of capital [15].
When the company’s financial position is satisfactory, and the
company possesses growth capability (buy companies), the
management’s inclination to convey positive (true) information
to shareholders will increase, which will increase the manage-
ment’s predictions’ optimism [5,16].
Consistent with Dutta and Gigler’s [2] model, for buy
companies, the forecasts convey the management’s true expecta-
tion to the market, which is followed by income increasing
earnings management. However, for the sell companies, the
forecasts do not convey true (or optimistic) information to the
market, but it is used to dampen the market expectations so that
the management can benefit from a positive stock price shock,
which is the result of positive earnings surprise.
This research tries to highlight the factor relating to the
companies’ growth status that influences the management’s
decision to report pessimistic forecast to produce positive FEs
when companies’ shares are recommended to sell, and generate
optimistic forecast when the companies’ shares are recommended
to buy. More specifically, this research tries to determine the
ability of analysts’ recommendations (in terms of buy or sell
recommendations) in explaining the reason behind FM.
Hypothesis Development
This study aims to examine the effects of the analysts’
recommendations as buy or sell recommendations, representing
the growth and non-growth companies on the managers’ decisions
towards forecasts management. In order to achieve this aim, four
hypotheses have been developed. This section briefly explains the
theoretical framework that leads to the hypotheses.
Analysts’ recommendations and pessimistic forecasts
(H1)
Dutta and Gigler [2] propose an optimal communication
contract where managers who reports high forecasts of income are
penalized when such a report is followed by low incomes. The
managers who report low forecasts however, are shielded from the
risk associated with the reported earnings. They claim that some
managers issue high forecasts and subsequently manipulate
earnings to realize those forecasts.
Abarbanell and Leahvy [1] conducted an empirical investiga-
tion. Depending on whether analysts issue strong sell, sell, buy,
and strong buy recommendations, the companies’ stocks are either
classified as sell or buy, where buy companies are assumed to be
more profitable than sell companies.
Buy companies. Abarbanell and Leahvy [1] examined the
buy companies and found that firstly, the stock prices of buy
companies are susceptible to earnings’ news. Secondly, buy
companies can effectively conduct income increasing earnings
management. Thus, they show that buy companies issue high
forecasts and in order to avoid market punishment, they conduct
income increasing earnings management to realize those forecasts.
This income increasing earnings management in buy companies
is consistent with Dutta and Gigler [2] proposition, which shows
earnings’ management being observed only following a high
forecast.
Sell companies. However, sell companies pursue a different
strategy. Sell companies are considered low profit companies,
rendering them unable to effectively conduct income increasing
earnings management [1]. This assumption is due to the following
reasons; firstly, since sell companies are less vigilantly monitored
by investors, their stock price are less susceptible to earnings news
[17], making their earnings management ineffective in influencing
investors’ opinions [1]. In other words, sell companies cannot
effectively manipulate and increase low profit to increase stock
prices. Secondly, sell companies are companies that have a meager
sum of available accounting reserves and pre-managed earnings to
realize any relevant earnings target [1].
Taking into account the aforementioned issues, it seems that
unlike buy companies, if sell companies issue high forecasts, they
cannot conduct effective earnings management to realize the
forecasts afterward, and it is more than likely that they miss the
forecasts. Therefore, to prevent this from happening, sell
companies prefer to issue low forecasts. Therefore, the first
hypothesis would be:
H1: Sell companies issue more pessimistic forecasts than Buy
companies.
Analysts’ Recommendations and Frequency of Positive
Forecast Errors (H2)
Prior researchers have confirmed the fact that since negative FE
could cause a negative shock in the stock market and deteriorate
Analysts’ Recommendations & Management Forecasts
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management (company) status, the management engage in FM to
avoid negative FEs [13,18].
Buy companies are growth companies and enjoy high profits.
Missing the forecasts in the buy companies will inevitably lead to a
decrease in the stock’s price. However, sell companies usually
suffer from poor earnings performance, which would be a glaring
evidence of managerial incompetence [1]. Missing the forecasts for
sell companies would cost managers the support of stockholders,
and potentially, their very own jobs [19,20].
Since failure in realizing forecasts exposes the sell companies to
severe risks, namely, litigation risk, contract termination risk and
takeover risk [19,21,22], sell companies are expected to meet their
forecasts and avoid the negative FEs more than their counterparts.
Thus, it is expected that sell companies have higher frequency of
positive FEs than buy companies, therefore, the second hypothesis
would be:
H2: Sell companies have higher frequency of positive forecast errors than
buy companies.
Forecast Management and Meeting the Forecasts (H3
and H4)
Brown and Caylor [11] stated that investors unambiguously
reward firms for reporting earnings that meet their forecasts and
penalize firms for reporting earnings that misses their forecasts.
The companies that analysts recommend to sell (sell companies)
are the companies that does not have high growth capabilities and
suffer from poor performance, which would be a glaring evidence
of managerial incompetence [1]. These companies are already
affected by the unsatisfactory conditions of the stock market, and if
they miss forecasts, they risk further deterioration of the market
state. However, unlike the buy companies, the sell companies do
not possess enough resources, and have less accounting flexibility
to manipulate the profit and meet their respective forecasts.
Hence, sell companies seek an alternative method to meet the
forecasts.
Therefore, if the company is in the sell position, the
management may issue lower forecasts in order to dampen the
expectation of outsiders [23]. Based on the result of the firm’s
ordinary operations, the management would then report an
earning that is equal to or higher than the forecast (report positive
forecast error), as doing so will raise the bids for the company’s
stocks, and subsequently, increase the company’s stock price.
This provides enough incentives for sell companies to decrease
their forecasts in order to create future positive FEs.
Thus, if FM in sell firms is effectively conducted to realize
positive FE, then companies that meet forecasts should have
conducted higher income decreasing FMs than the companies that
miss forecasts. Following this assumption, the following hypotheses
for sell companies should be supported.
H3: In sell companies, companies that meet forecasts have done more
income decreasing FM than companies that do not meet forecasts.
For buy companies, it is important to meet the forecasts, as
negative forecast errors cause negative shocks in the stock price.
Buy companies have high profitability, and therefore have enough
resources to manipulate earnings [1,2], and can efficiently manage
earnings to meet their forecasts.
Thus, in the buy companies, companies that meet forecasts do
not necessarily conduct income decreasing FM to meet forecasts.
Thus, we expect the fourth hypothesis for the buy companies to be
supported.
H4: There is not significant difference in income decreasing FM
between buy companies that meet forecasts and those that do not meet
forecasts.
Materials and Methods
Models
The Relationship of Analysts’ Recommendations and
Forecast Management (H1). The first hypothesis will be
tested by running the regression of FM on the Analysts’
Recommendations (AR), including moderator variables (Learning
effect and Difficulty) and several control variables, and the reason
for the usage and measurement process of will be explained in
section 4.4.
Pr ob(Down~1)~F (a0za1ARza2AR|Difficultyz
a3AR|FREQza4LMVza5MBza6Hightechz
a7Lag Lossze)
ð1Þ
Where,
Down= 1 if company does income decreasing FM (FM is
negative) and Down= 0 otherwise
AR= the Analysts’ recommendations that takes the value of 1 to
5 (Section 4.2.1)
Difficulty=Difficulty to assess the credibility of management’s
forecasts
FREQ= frequency of FM in the previous four years as index of
learning effect
LMV=Logarithm of market value
MB=Market to Book value
Hightech=1 if the firm is in one of the high technology industries
such as pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft, medical, preci-
sion and optical instruments, radio, television and communication
equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery, and 0
otherwise.
Lag_loss=1 when a firm’s quarterly earnings report preceding
the forecast is negative, and 0 otherwise
Taking a page out of Rakow [24], we converted LMV and MB
as indicator variables that are set to one, if the value of the original
variable is greater than or equal to the sample median, or zero
otherwise.
Using dummy variables instead of continuous variables allows
a1 in equation (1) to be interpreted as the effect of the independent
variable when the dummy variable is equal to zero, while a4
through a7 can be interpreted as the effect of each variable when
the dummy variable is equal to one.
The Relationship of Analysts’ Recommendations and
Frequency of Forecast Errors (H2). H2 is tested by running
the following logit regression:
Pr ob(meet~1)~F (a0za1ARza2FREQza3Difficultyz
a4LMVza5MBza6DAza7Hightechza8Lag lossze)
ð2Þ
Where,
FEs are represented by the variable meet, which equals 1 if a
firm’s actual earnings meet or exceeds the management’s forecasts,
and 0 if otherwise.
Analysts’ Recommendations & Management Forecasts
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DA is the firm’s ability to manipulate earnings, as reflected by its
discretionary accruals, which makes it ideal as a control variable.
We use a version of the cross-sectional modified Jones model
which is introduced by Ye [25] for the purpose of estimating
discretionary accruals.
Other variables are similar to what was explained for equation
(1).
The Relationship of forecast management and forecast
errors (H3 and H4). For the purpose of testing H3, the
ANOVA will be used to test the difference of the mean value of
FM between the companies that meet or miss forecasts in sell
companies.
We will do the same test for buy companies in order to test the
fourth hypothesis.
Variables
There are three types of variables, such as independent,
dependent and control variables that are being investigated in
this study. Their respective measurements are discussed in this
section.
Analysts’ Recommendations (Independent Variable).
Following Heidle and Li [26], and Abarbanell and Lehavy [1], it is
believed that the perception of the companies’ future growth are
duly reflected in the analysts’ recommendations. Since analysts’
recommendations fluctuates at levels less than the bid and ask
spread [27] and ask and bid prices [26], it would remain
unaffected by market sentiments, and it is assumed that it would be
more reliable in capturing the company’s growth perspective.
Analysts’ recommendations come in five forms, namely strong
buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell. The rating assigned to each
recommendation is displayed in Table 1.
Following Abarbanell and Lehavy [1], this research uses
outstanding average (consensus) recommendations at the end of
each day in the first, middle and last three weeks of the first month
of the fourth quarter. The average recommendation for firm i, on
date t is assumed to be Ait.
Following Abarbanell and Lehavy [1], each observation is
placed in one of the three categories. The first category consists of
firms where Ait#2 (denoted ‘‘Buy’’ stocks), the second category
includes firms where 2,Ait#3 (‘‘Hold’’ stocks), while the third
contains the least favorably recommended firms, where Ait.3
(‘‘Sell’’ stocks).
The number of buy and sell companies and the criteria for
dividing them are shown in Table 2. In order to compare means
(ANOVA tables) in section 5.3, since the extreme growth (buy) and
non-growth (sell) companies are taken into account, the hold
companies are omitted.
Forecast Management (H1) (Dependent Variable). Foll-
owing Burgstahler and Eames [7] and Matsumoto [28], the proxy
for FM is measured as follows:
DEPSijtq
Pijtq{4
~b0ijzb1ijt
DEPSijtq{1
Pijtq{5
 
zb2ijtCRETijtqzeijtq ð3Þ
Where,
Subscripts refer to firm i, industry code j, quarter q, and year t,
and
DEPSijtq= earnings per share changes between the current
quarter and four quarters prior.
Pijtq=price per share of common equity, and
CRETijtq= cumulative daily excess returns from three days after
the four quarters prior earnings announcement to 20 days before
the current quarter earnings announcement.
b1ijt and b2ijt= the coefficients of the regression.
Similar to Matsumoto [28], (1) the model for each firm-year is
estimated using all of the firm quarters of the year from the same
industry, except those firms for which the parameters are
estimated; (2) only firm-years with 10 or more firm-quarters of
data in the same industry are included in the estimation, and (3)
observations with variable values in the top and bottom half per
cent of the respective distributions are omitted in order to mitigate
the impact of extreme values on the parameter estimates. Then,
the obtained parameter estimates were used to determine the
expected earnings changes from the prior firm year’s fourth
quarter:
E(DEPSijtq)~b0ij{1zb1ijt{1(DEPSijtq{1)z
b2ijt{1(CRETijtq)Pijtq{4
ð4Þ
This expected change is added to earnings per share from the
same quarter in the prior year in order to obtain the expected
forecast of the current quarter’s earnings:
E(Fijtq)~EPSijtq{4zE(DEPSijtq) ð5Þ
Consequently, in order to obtain the expected forecast of annual
earnings, we estimated the fourth quarter expected earnings (from
equation (5)), and added the prior three quarters of earnings
realizations. We took into account the differences between the last
reported forecast, and the model-derived expected forecast as a
proxy for FM. In order to avoid including preannouncements,
forecasts that has been reported near the end of the year have been
excluded from the sample.
Table 1. Recommendations and their assigned ratings.
Recommendations
Strong
buy buy hold Sell
Strong
sell
Rating 1 2 3 4 5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t001
Table 2. The number of company years with buy, hold and
sell recommendations.
BUY HOLD SELL
AitConsensus analysts’
recommendations =
Aitƒ2 2vAitƒ3 3vAit
No of companies in
each category
2078 3063 6278
The company years are divided to buy, hold and sell categories on the basis of
consensus analysts’ recommendations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t002
Analysts’ Recommendations & Management Forecasts
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FM~Re ported Forecast{E(Fijtq) ð6Þ
Forecast Errors (H2) (Dependent Variable). According to
Fang [29], Rogers and Stocken [30] and Xu [31], FE is calculated
using the following formula:
FE~
(Forecasted EPS{Re ported EPS)
Share price of the company at the end of 4th Quarter
ð7Þ
Forecasted EPS is the last forecast of the EPS that is reported by
the management to the market.
Learning Effect (Moderating - Control Variable). The
market may learn from a firm’s FM behavior over a period of time
[30]. If the market discerns from a firm’s history that it has
habitually engaged in downward FM, they may expect the firms
engaging in downward FM in its history to repeat this behavior,
and carry out more downward FM than the cleaner firms.
Consequently, market expectations will be weakly affected by the
current FM. Thus, a rational manager may find it to be in their
interest not to frequently manage forecasts downward [30,32].
Therefore, we use a moderating variable, which reflects the
frequency of forecast management (FREQ). Depending on the
number of times the firm has conducted downward FM in the four
previous periods, this variable can have the value of 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Difficulty (Moderating -Control Variable). Difficulty re-
flects the degree of a market participants’ ability to assess the
credibility of the managements’ forecast. According to Rogers and
Stocken [30], factor analysis was used on several variables
(indicators) for the purpose of identifying the difficulty construct.
It is assumed that the indicator specific variances are uncorrelated
across variables. Consistent with the goal of predicting FM, all
variables are measured prior to the release of the forecasts. The
following indicator variables generate a measure of forecasting
difficulty [30]:
The standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when
the management forecast is released, STD_AF, measures the lack
of analysts’ consensus. The standard deviation of the previous
analysts’ forecasts errors, scaled by price for five years prior to the
forecast release, STD_AFE, proxies for the difficulties analysts
experienced when predicting earnings. It is more difficult to
forecast a firm’s earnings when the firm is unprofitable compared
to when it is profitable. In order to recognize this asymmetry, the
indicator Lag-Loss equals to 1 when a firm’s quarterly earnings
report preceding the forecast is negative, and 0 if otherwise. Also,
the indicator of Predict-Loss equals 1 when the management
forecast of earnings is negative, and 0 if vice versa. The standard
deviation of the daily stock price for 120 days before the forecast
date was measured and denoted as STD_RET. A firm’s bid-ask
spread is expected to increase with uncertainty regarding the firm’s
forthcoming earnings announcement (see [33]).
Table 3 reports the results of the factor analysis, when the
continuous indicators of forecast difficulty are winsorized at 1 and
99 percent levels.
All of the significant correlations among the indicators possess
their expected signs. The Difficulty latent variable is estimated by
using Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). Standard factor analysis
heuristics (e.g., scree-plots and eigenvalues) suggested three factors,
and after accounting for the sign and magnitude of the factor
loadings, the first factor is extracted as a measure of forecast
difficulty.
The values for difficulty ranges from 20.58 to 0.84, where the
lower value for this variable represent less difficulty for market
participants to assess the credibility of management’s forecasts,
while higher values are indicative of higher level of difficulties.
Other Control Variables. One of the other control variable
is the threat of litigation. Soffer et al.[34] stated that firms in a
litigious environment want to prevent a large disappointment in
the earnings announcement date, and this might be better
accomplished by providing a less optimistic or even pessimistic
forecast shortly before the earnings release date.
Kasznik and Lev [35] posits that firms in high-tech industries
face higher risk of litigation as they experience larger price
fluctuations, which might translate into potential losses to the
investors. Similarly, Baginski et al. [36] used the high-tech
industries to control the potential firm-specific litigation risks.
The earnings of high-tech firms are more volatile, and inherently
carry greater risks of inaccurate forecasts; all these factors could
affect a firm’s cost of capital. Therefore, a negative coefficient is
predicted vis-a`-vis high-tech, implying that high technology firms
issue less optimistic forecasts.
In addition, similar to Rogers and Stocken [28], market to book
value (MB), and loss in the previous period (Lag_loss) are used as
control variables.
Data and sample
The company’s stock trading information, along with the
forecast data, is gathered from the Bloomberg database. The
potential market that was considered for data collection is
companies in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
The Bloomberg database is used to identify 14414 annual
financial statements that were released between January 2005 and
December 2010. From this number of companies, the AR for
11419 companies were made available (table 2).
Since firms in regulated industries are more likely to have
different incentives than non-regulated industries [28], regulated
industries, including utilities, transportation companies, and
financial services are excluded from the sample [37,38]. Compa-
nies with insufficient data in Bloomberg database are also
excluded.
Among the remaining company-years, the Bloomberg database
was searched for management earnings estimates, and actual
(realized) earnings. The database was also searched for data
regarding the analysts’ recommendations, along with other
relevant financial data pertaining to this work.
Based on the availability of the aforementioned data, and to
carry out prediction tests, which involves examining forecasts
reactions to analysts’ recommendations, a subsample of 6553
forecasts were used. The sample selection procedure is summa-
rized in Table 4.
The hypotheses were tested in two subsamples. The first
subsample was 6553 company-years, while the second subsample
was 2449 company-years, which were in the vicinity of zero
forecast errors. The reason for using the second subsample is
explained in section 5.
Findings
Burgstahler and Eames [36] argued that the benefit of FM to a
firm may increase the amount of FM, i.e. there may be
incremental benefits to beating rather than just meeting the
analysts’ forecasts. However, FM also imposes a cost on the firm. If
there is a sudden drop in the marginal benefit at the point just to
the right of the zero surprise point for many firms, then zero
surprise is the optimal level that a firm should realize by
conducting FM. Realistically, this scenario is entirely possible.
The benefit(s) for the firms to just meet expectations is much larger
Analysts’ Recommendations & Management Forecasts
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than that for the firms just failing to meet expectations by a small
margin, whereas the benefit to firms that beat expectations is only
marginally larger than that of the firms that just barely meet
expectations. This argument implies that firms that just meet
expectations are more likely to have conducted FM, compared to
firms that just fail to meet expectations and firms that do beat
expectations.
Therefore, the main statistical tests are divided into two parts. In
the first part, the hypotheses are tested by taking into account all of
the involved company-years (first subsample). In the second part,
the hypotheses are tested by considering the company-years that
are in the vicinity of zero forecast errors (second subsample).
Since the distance near zero forecast error should be very small,
and also since enough number of companies should be considered
for analysis, the distance of 0.5 standard deviation of forecast error
on the left and right side of zero forecast error is taken as small
distance around zero FE.
Relationship of analysts’ recommendations and forecast
management (H1)
Table 5 reports the results for the logistic regression analysis of
FM (equation 6).
The interaction term AR and FREQ is used to measure the effect
of learning from historical FM on the relationship between AR and
FM. Thus, the algebraic expression for equation (5) is that a1 is
positive. However, the algebraic expression of learning effect is
that a3 is negative and significant. Within this specification, the
coefficient of FM to AR should be a1+a36FREQ.
The coefficient of FM to AR for a non-difficult firm is a1.
However, the coefficient of FM to AR for a difficult firm is a1+a2.
Table 3. Correlation Matrices and Factor Loadings for Forecast Difficulty Measure.
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Forecast Difficulty Indicators
STD-AF STD-AFE Lag_Loss Predict-Loss STD-Ret Spread
STD-AF 0.001 0.033* 0.052* 0.330** 0.001
STD-AFE 20.001 20.031 20.075 0.970** 0.320**
Lag-loss 20.014 0.144** 0.104** 20.036 0.051*
Predict-loss 0.077** 0.050 0.104** 20.054 20.050
STD-Ret 0.330** 0.954** 0.171** 20.029 0.954**
Spread 0.019 0.740** 0.188** 0.160** 0.748**
Panel B: Factor Loadings
Indicator STD-AF STD-AFE Lagged-loss Predict-loss STD-Ret Spread
Factor Loading 0.065 0.997 0.015 20.021 0.997 0.118
Standardized Factor Score 0.039 0.958 0.112 20.39 0.954 0.854
Panel C: Test of appropriateness of factor analysis
Total Variance Explained 68.30% Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Chi-Square 50690
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
Measure of Sampling
Adequacy
.620 Sig. 0.000**
*, **Significant at 5% and 1% level.
Table 4. Sampling procedure.
Number of all company-years in NYSE (2005–10) 14414
Less: Companies that their AR are not available (2995)
Number of the companies for which AR is available (Table 2) 11419
Less: Utilities, transportation or financial service 2238
Forecasts are not available 215
Forecasts issued less than one month prior to the end of fiscal year 823
Insufficient data to calculate standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts 488
Missing data for control variables on Bloomberg 265
Insufficient time-series data on Bloomberg 603
Forecasts that are not in quarter 4 234
(4866)
Sample company-years for testing hypotheses 6553
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t004
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Taking into account Table 5 for the first subsample, the
coefficient of AR is positive and significant at a 5% level, for the
second subsample, the coefficient of AR are positive and significant
at a 1% level. This implies that when the AR for the company is
high (i.e. the company is in sell position), the companies conduct
higher income decreasing FM compared to when the AR is low
(the company is in buy position). The coefficients of AR6Difficulty
are significantly positive in both subsamples (subsample of all
company-years and subsample of company-years, which are near
zero FE), implying that when it is more difficult for analysts and
investors to forecast the company’s profit, and thus recognize the
credibility of the management forecasts, the management will do
more income decreasing FM. Additionally, the coefficient of
frequency (AR6FREQ) is significant and negative in the second
subsample. This shows that the frequency of the previous year’s
FM moderates the relationship between AR and FM.
Thus, as a result of the significance of the coefficients of AR in
both subsamples, it is concluded that AR affects FM, and the first
hypothesis is supported. In addition, difficulty and frequency
moderate the relationship between AR and FM in companies in a
small distance around zero FE. This result shows that managers
strategically manipulate their forecasts downward, making it more
difficult for the market to assess the truthfulness of their disclosure.
With respect to control variables, the coefficients of lag_Loss are
significantly positive for the first subsample at 0.05 and for the
second subsample at 0.1. This means that the companies that
experience lagged loss conduct more downward FM compared to
other companies. Also, in the case of companies in a small distance
around zero FE, the coefficient of LMV is significant at a 0.1
significance level, and possess its expected values. The coefficients
on the remaining control variables are rather insignificant.
The marginal effects are analogous to the slope’s coefficients in
an OLS regression [35]. The marginal effect for AR is 1.993 and
2.012 for first and second subsamples, respectively, suggesting that
moving from the first to the third quartile of AR, the probability of
meeting or exceeding expectations increases by approximately 99
and 101 percent, respectively. The values of the marginal effects of
AR6Difficulty are 2.577 and 1.282 for the first and second
subsamples, respectively. They indicated that the companies that
the credibility of their management’s forecasts are most difficult to
be assessed by market participants, the probability of its FM is
approximately 2.57 and 1.28 times more than the least difficult
firms.
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was used to test the fitness of
the models. The test result shown in the lower part of Table 5 is
not significant for any of the models, confirming the goodness of fit
of the models. Additionally, in order to see the robustness of the
results, after dropping each one of the control variables, there were
no significant changes in the robustness of the model.
In addition, for determining the presence of multicollinearity,
the VIF statistics for independent variables in regression (1)
(untabulated) demonstrated no sign of high correlation between
independent and control variables.
Relationship of analyst’s recommendations and
frequency of positive forecast errors (H2)
To examine the relationship of analysts’ recommendations and
the frequency of positive FEs, analogous to Matsumoto [26], and
by using a cross-sectional logit regression, the regression in
equation (2) is estimated (firm and time subscripts have been
suppressed):
The results of the logit regressions are indicated in Table 6.
In Table 6, the coefficient on AR is positive but non-significant
for the first subsample, however, for the second subsample, the
coefficient of AR is negative and significant suggesting that buy
companies are more likely to meet forecasts. Contradicting
expectations, in small distance around zero FE, sell companies
Table 5. Results for the Management Forecast Bias Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1).
Model Prob(Down=1) = F(a0+a1 AR+a2AR6Difficulty+a3AR6FREQ+a4 LMV+a5 MB+a6 Hightech+a7 Lag_Loss+e)
Dependent Variable: (Down= 1) if forecast management is negative and (Down= 0) otherwise
Variable Predicted sign Coefficients p-values Marginal effects
First Subsample
Second
Subsample
First
Subsample
Second
Subsample First Subsample
Second
Subsample
Independents
Constant ? 1.034 21.75 0.276 0.892 2 2
AR + 0.689 0.699 0.01** 0.000*** 1.993 2.012
Control Variables
AR*Difficulty + 3.25 2.662 0. 03*** 0.021** 2.577 1.282
AR*FREQ 2 20.115 20.151 0.114 0.019** 0.891 0.86
LMV + 0.155 0.353 0.422 0.023** 1.167 1.424
M/B 2 20.006 20.003 0.654 0.686 0.994 0.995
Hightech + 20.18 20.181 0.399 0.102 0.835 0.834
Lag_Loss + 0.499 0.739 0.044** 0.098* 1.647 1.538
Log Likelihood 564.693 564.435 Hosmer Lemeshow
Chi-square 57.602 59.383 Pearson x2 510.36 510.13
P-value 0.000*** 0.000*** Prob 0.243 0.246
Logistic regression results of the first and second subsamples. The coefficients and related t-statistics are estimated by using the following model:
Prob(Down= 1) = F(a0+a1 AR+a2AR6Difficulty+a3AR6FREQ+a4 LMV+a5 MB+a6 Hightech+a7 Lag_Loss+e).
*, **,***Significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed tests otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t005
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do not possess higher positive forecasts errors. Thus, the second
hypothesis is not supported. The reason might be that buy
companies might have used income increasing earnings manage-
ment strategy to meet the forecasts. In order to produce positive
forecasts errors, the income increasing earnings management in
buy companies might have been more efficient than income
decreasing FMs in sell companies. The coefficient of FREQ is
negative and significant at 1% in both subsamples, indicating that
if a company has high frequency of income decreasing FM in the
previous years, the probability of having positive FE decreases in
the current year. This confirms Rogers and Stocken [30] findings
that managers have fewer incentives to avoid negative surprises
when the frequency of downward FM in previous years is high.
Additionally, for both subsamples, the coefficient of Difficulty is
positive and significant, which is consistent with Rogers and
Stocken [30] notion that managers have more incentives to
conduct FM, and thus avoid negative surprises when the
recognition of FM is more difficult for investors. The coefficient
of lag_loss is negative and significant, consistent with the conjecture
that those firms with low value-relevance of earnings have less
incentive to avoid negative FEs. The positive but insignificant
coefficient of Hightech implies that firms with relatively higher
litigation prospects appear to be marginally more likely to avoid
negative FEs.
Columns 7 and 8 report the marginal effect of each variable. It
is analogous to the slope coefficients in an OLS regression [35].
The marginal effects for frequency are 0.375 and 0.411. These
values suggest that moving from the first to the third quartile of
FREQ decreases the probability of meeting or exceeding analysts’
expectations by approximately 62.5 and 58.9 percent in the first
and second subsamples, respectively. The marginal effect for
difficulty equals 1.879 and 2.117 in the first and second
subsamples, indicating that an increase in the difficulty of
predicting future profits increasing the probability of meeting or
exceeding analysts’ expectations by 87 and 111 percent, respec-
tively. The marginal effect for Lag_loss equals to 0.742 and 0.999,
implying that in firms that reported losses in the previous period,
the probability of meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations is
lower by 26 and 1 percent in the first and second subsamples,
respectively.
Relationship of forecast management and forecast errors
in buy and sell companies (H3, H4)
For testing the third hypothesis, the difference of mean values of
FM of the companies that possess zero or positive FEs (meet or
beat forecasts), and the companies that possess negative FEs (miss
forecasts) in sell groups are tested. Columns 3 to 5 of Table 7 show
the results of the test.
Tests of differences in mean values of FM between companies
that meet or beat forecasts, and the companies that miss forecasts
in the group of sell companies showed that there is no significant
difference in the mean values of FM between them for the first
subsample. However, in the second subsample, the companies that
meet forecasts have significantly lower value of FM compared to
companies that misses forecasts. This means that in sell companies
of subsample 2, the companies that meet or beat forecasts possess
more downward FM than companies that fail to meet their
forecasts. Thus, in this subsample, H3 is supported.
Table 6. Logit analysis of the probability of meeting or exceeding forecasts and the incentives to avoid negative FEs.
Model Prob(meet = 1) = F(a0+a1 AR+a2 FREQ+a3 Difficulty+a4 LMV+a5 MB+a6DA+a7Hightech+a8 Lag_loss+e)
Dependent Variable: (meet = 1) if the reported profit meets of exceed forecasts and zero otherwise.
Variable Predicted sign Coefficients p-values Marginal effects
First Subsample
Second
Subsample
First
Subsample
Second
Subsample First Subsample
Second
Subsample
Intercept ? 21.694 21.217 0.046 0.198 2 2
Independent
AR + 0.374 20.381 0.136 0.072* 1.235 0.464
Control Variables
FREQ 2 20.981 20.890 0. 002*** 0.002** 0.375 0.411
Difficulty + 0.832 0.960 0.001*** 0.001** 1.879 2.117
LMV + 0.147 0.200 0.344 0.355 1.159 1.221
MB + 0.004 0.003 0.596 0.540 1.004 1.003
DA + 0.000 0.021 0.590 0.816 1.000 0.899
High-tech 2 0.345 0.288 0.121 0.117 1.412 1.334
Lag_loss + 0.555 0.693 0.077* 0.028* 0.742 0.999
Year + 0.571 0.561 0.015 0.016* 1.771 1.762
Log Likelihood 544.183 544.018 Hosmer Lemeshow
Chi-square 170.837 171.032 Pearson x2 4726.44 639.78
P-value 0 0.000 Prob 0.3028 0.6263
Meet/Exceed 3043 1372
Did not meet 2623 1077
The regression is run on the first and second subsamples. The coefficients and related t-statistics are estimated by using the following model:
Prob(meet = 1) = F(a0+a1 AR+a2 FREQ+a3 Difficulty+a4 LMV+a5 MB+a6DA+a7Hightech+a8 Lag_loss+e).
*, **,***Significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed tests otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t006
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In addition, columns 6 to 8 of Table 7 shows the result of testing
the difference in mean values of FM between the companies that
possess zero or positive FEs, and the companies that possess
negative FEs in the buy group.
Tests of difference in the mean values of FM between
companies that meet or beat forecasts, and the companies that
miss their forecasts in the group of buy companies showed that
there is no significant difference in the mean value of FM between
them for the first subsample. For the second subsample, although
the difference is significant at a 10% significance level, it is not
strong enough to reject the fourth hypothesis. Therefore, H4 is
supported.
Discussion
The findings of this research shows that income decreasing FM
is more evident in sell firms (H1). Sell companies conduct income
decreasing FM to avoid negative forecasts errors and its
consequent market punishments that unfavorably affects the
management’s utility (H3).
However, avoiding negative forecasts errors via conducting
income decreasing FM is not evident in buy firms (H4). This result
is consistent with Abarbanell and Lehavy [1], who found that
instead of carrying out income decreasing FM, buy companies
conduct income increasing earnings management to meet
forecasts and produce positive FEs.
Behavior of the buy companies
The findings for (H1) indicate that in buy companies,
management conveys less pessimistic forecasts to the market. In
addition, the findings for (H4) showed that there is not a significant
difference in FM between the buy companies that meet or miss
their forecasts. Since for buy companies that have favorable
financial records, investors are more responsive to forecasted news,
such firms would like to have their private information more fully
impounded into their stock prices, and consequently are more
capable of reducing information asymmetries in the market, and
enjoy lower cost of capital [33,39,40].
Assuming that the management seeks to align market expecta-
tions with their own (see Ajinkya and Gift [41]), it is especially true
that when the management have extremely promising news to
convey [42], and therefore, a favorable track record will be most
helpful in enhancing the forecasts’ credibility of buy companies.
The reason might be due to the fact that by conveying true
information regarding their favorable records, buy companies’
private information, which is usually promising, is fully impounded
into their stock prices, and consequently, they are more capable of
reducing information asymmetry and enjoy lower costs of capital.
Additionally, buy companies are able to do income increasing
earnings management to meet the forecasts. Therefore, they need
to do less income decreasing FM than sell companies. This might
be interpreted as the discovery of the fact that buy companies
convey a less pessimistic forecast to the market.
Behavior of the sell companies
The sell companies conduct high income decreasing FM (H1
supported) to realize positive forecasts errors (H3 supported). The
reason might be that sell companies issue pessimistic forecasts to
avoid the unfavorable utility minimizing consequences of missing
forecasts.
In other words, sell companies conduct downward FM to avoid
market punishments that results from missing forecasts [16,43].
The reason for this is that as mentioned in section 1 (Introduction),
sell companies do not usually generate high economic profits.
Therefore, the pessimistic forecasts of sell companies are to avoid
market punishments, rather than being opportunistic.
According to Dutta and Gigler [2] framework, the pessimistic
forecasts of sell companies might not be due to opportunism. Such
pessimism makes their reporting process to be consistent with the
efficiency perspective that corresponds with the revelation
principle. Therefore, consistent with Dutta and Giggler’s [2]
proposition, it is optimal to render income increasing earnings
management potentially costly for sell (non-growth) companies, so
that they do not report delusive optimistic forecasts.
Conclusion
This research adds to the literature by finding an additional
factor that affects management decisions toward issuing forecasts.
It has been found that the companies’ growth statuses that are
represented by analysts’ recommendations (as buy or sell
recommendations) can affect the managements’ decision to
conduct FM.
This study helps to understand the mixed findings in the
management forecasts literature. While the previous studies
suggested that management forecasts are opportunistic, and the
management uses the forecasts to manage the analysts’ forecasts
[44,45] and affect the stock prices [46], there are several other
studies that showed that since management’s forecast conveys
insider information to the outsiders, it helps to lessen information
Table 7. Test of difference in mean forecast management for the companies that meet management forecasts and the companies
that miss forecasts in the Sell (H3) and Buy (H4) companies.
Sell Buy
No. Mean STDEV No. Mean STDEV
Positive or zero FE FM First Subsample 2764 20.0067 0.105 936 20.0012 0.0768
FM Second Subsample 908 27.09E-03 0.0080 394 5.59E-03 0.00658
Negative FE FM First Subsample 2593 0.0032 0.15 828 0.0065 0.1128
FM Second Subsample 732 7.68E-03 0.0135 298 2.46E-02 0.01338
ANOVA’s F Sig. ANOVA’s F Sig.
FM First Subsample 0.098 0.756 1.222 0.274
FM Second Subsample 5.1830 0.023** 2.7457 0.098*
*, **: Significance at 0.1 and 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073853.t007
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asymmetry, hence decreasing costly litigation of the stockholders
against the company [16,43]. It also helps the company to have
clear and transparent financial reporting [3,12]. This study adds to
the mixed findings in the literature by demonstrating that the
management’s forecasts contains a bias that is predictable, taking
into account the analysts’ recommendations about the company.
This research is practically useful, as it extends the existing
knowledge regarding the information content of the management’s
forecasts that affect decisions of the users of the financial
information. The findings warn investors to carefully evaluate
the management’s forecasts on the basis of whether the companies
have buy and sell recommendations before they form their
expectations about the company. The findings suggest that the
information regarding the analysts’ recommendations might
contain important implications for FM, as they might convey
informational values that can be used by researchers or even
investors.
While the present study reveals some significant points in terms
of reliability and accuracy of management forecasts, the findings
should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. Gathering
data from different markets and from different time periods, and
using different FM measurement models might illuminate the issue
of the reliability of management forecasts.
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